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1. INTRODUCTION
In November 2015, the Guardian newspaper reported severe and widespread abuse 
of migrant workers within the Irish fishing industry.1 The patterns of exploitation 
identified by the team of journalists mirror findings across other jurisdictions and 
sectors relating to the labour conditions of migrant workers.2 They included workers 
being confined to vessels unless given permission to go on land; receiving no proper 
rest days; and being paid less than half the Irish minimum wage.3
The Guardian reports led to intense media coverage and pressure on the Irish 
Government, prompting the immediate formation of a Task Force and ultimately 
the adoption of an ‘Atypical Working Scheme for non-EEA crew in the Fishing 
Fleet’4 which sought to formalise and regularise the workers’ immigration and 
employment status. This is not a legislative measure as such: in the Irish system, 
atypical working schemes are administrative measures emanating from the Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service (within the Department of Justice and 
Equality). Atypical working schemes provide for permits for ‘atypical, short term 
1 ‘Revealed: Trafficked Migrant Workers Abused in Irish Fishing Industry’, Guardian, 2 
November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/nov/02/revealed-traf-
ficked-migrant-workers-abused-in-irish-fishing-industry (last accessed 13 June 2016).
2 In respect of the fishing sector, see International Labour Office, Caught at Sea: Forced 
Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries (Geneva: ILO, 2013); C. Stringer, S. Hughes, D. Whittaker, 
N. Haworth and G. Simmons, ‘Labour Standards and Regulation in Global Value Chains: 
The Case of the New Zealand Fishing Industry’ (2016) 48 Environment and Planning 1910. 
More generally, see International Labour Office, Promoting Fair Migration: General Survey 
Concerning the Migrant Workers Instruments (Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations; Articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution); 
Report III, Part 1B (Geneva: ILO, 2016), at 6–8.
3 The Guardian, 2 November 2015, n.1. According to the Guardian, the findings are based 
on extensive undercover interviewing and filming in Irish fishing ports as well as worker tes-
timony. They are corroborated by documentary evidence and by interviews with several well-
placed sources.
4 Hereinafter, ‘Atypical Scheme’.
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employment’ not governed by the Employment Permits Acts 2003–20145 and thus 
constitute a form of regulatory regime for temporary labour migration. Ancillary 
reforms included the clarification of enforcement powers of the labour inspector-
ate to facilitate inspection of fishing vessels and the adoption of an inter-agency 
Memorandum of Understanding between the key enforcement bodies to stream-
line the effective enforcement of health and safety, marine and employment regula-
tions in the sector.
This package of measures constitutes an attempt to address the vulnerabil-
ity to labour exploitation of a group of migrant workers primarily through the 
medium of ordinary employment and immigration regulation, as opposed to a 
criminal justice approach akin to that adopted in the UK in the Modern Slavery 
Act 2015, for example.6 This article examines the Atypical Scheme as a potential 
model of good practice for the use of regulation to counteract vulnerability to 
labour exploitation of migrant workers. More broadly, it considers the dual role 
of the law in this domain. The legal and institutional framework plays a signifi-
cant role in creating vulnerability to labour exploitation. Paradoxically, however, 
legal tools also have the potential to counteract or address this vulnerability. On 
the question of the appropriate legal tools to counteract vulnerability to labour 
exploitation among migrant workers, Zou has concluded that neither the inter-
national human rights framework nor the trafficking/‘modern slavery’ discourse, 
adequately responds to the complex realities of migrants’ work relations on a 
continuum of exploitation.7 This article is based on the premise that a focus on 
protective labour law regulation and enforcement is more likely to respond to 
these realities.
As the analysis here reveals, the devil is in the detail: industry-appropriate regula-
tion; effective enforcement; and evidence-based policy development are essential to 
ensure that legal reforms which appear progressive on paper have a real impact on 
the protection of workers’ rights.
5 Information available on the Department of Justice and Equality (Irish Naturalisation 
& Immigration Service), http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/atypical-working-general (last 
accessed 13 June 2017).
6 See J. Haynes, ‘The Modern Slavery Act (2015): A Legislative Commentary’ (2016) 37 
Statute Law Review 33; B. Anderson, ‘Migrant Domestic Workers: Good Workers, Poor Slaves, 
New Connections’ (2015) 22 Social Politics 636, in particular at 642–46; C. Robinson, ‘Claiming 
Space for Labour Rights within the United Kingdom Modern Slavery Crusade’ (2015) 9 Anti-
Trafficking Review; J. Fudge, ‘The Dangerous Appeal of the Modern Slavery Paradigm’, Open 
Democracy, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/judy-fudge/dangerous-appeal-
of-modern-slavery-paradigm (last accessed 13 June 2016); Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, 
‘Class Acts? Examining Modern Slavery Legislation Across the UK’ (London: ATMG, 2016).
7 M. Zou, ‘The Legal Construction of Hyper-Dependence and Hyper-Precarity in Migrant 
Work Relations’ (2015) 31 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 141.
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2. CREATING AND ADDRESSING VULNERABILITY TO LABOUR EXPLOITATION 
THROUGH LAW
A significant body of academic literature has explored the intersection between 
precarious employment and precarious migration status.8 Anderson observes that 
immigration law controls function as a ‘mould’, shaping certain types of workers into 
precarious workers—including through the selection of legal entrants, the enforce-
ment of certain types of employment relations and the creation of ‘institutionalised 
uncertainty’.9 Through this moulding process, she argues, migrant workers are placed 
in a position of precarity, their status and situation characterised by instability, lack 
of protection, insecurity and social and economic vulnerability.10 State strategies to 
address the perceived vulnerabilities of migrant workers usually fail to acknowledge 
the complicity of immigration controls in producing ‘relations of domination and 
subordination’.11
In addition to the precarity caused by immigration rules, some groups of migrant 
workers experience specific gaps in applicable employment protections, in work-
ing in sectors which are exempted or excluded from aspects of employment law. 
For example, the intersecting vulnerabilities of migrant domestic workers—linked 
to gender, race and socio-economic status—have been well documented, as has 
the role of immigration law and employment law in creating and perpetuating 
such vulnerability.12 In contrast, the specific experiences of male migrant workers 
8 See, among others, M.  Freedland and C.  Costello, Migrants at Work: Immigration and 
Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); E. Albin, ‘Introduction: 
Precarious Work and Human Rights’ (2012) 34 Comp Labour L & Policy J 1; C.  Murphy, 
‘The Enduring Vulnerability of Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 599; 
J. Fudge, ‘Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of International 
Rights for Migrant Workers’ (2012) 34 Comp Labour L & Policy J 95; B. Anderson, ‘Migration, 
Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers’ (2010) 24 Work, Employment 
& Society 300, at 303.
9 Anderson n.8, at 303.
10 Ibid. See in particular, Murphy n.8.
11 B. Anderson, ‘Where’s the Harm in That? Immigration Enforcement, Trafficking, and the 
Protection of Migrants’ Rights’ (2012) 56 American Behavioural Scientist 1241, at 1242.
12 B. Anderson, Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (London: Zed 
Books, 2000); D. McCann, ‘New Frontiers of Regulation: Domestic Work, Working Conditions 
and the Holistic Assessment of Non-standard Work Norms’ (2012–13) 34 Comparative Labour 
Law & Policy Journal 167; E. Albin and V. Mantouvalou, ‘The ILO Convention on Domestic 
Workers: From the Shadows to the Light’ (2012) 41 ILJ 67; S. Mullally and C. Murphy, ‘Migrant 
Domestic Workers in the UK: Enacting Exemptions, Exclusions, and Rights’ (2014) 36 
Human Rights Quarterly 397; J. Fudge and K. Strauss, ‘Migrants, Unfree Labour, and the Legal 
Construction of Domestic Servitude: Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK’ in M. Freedland 
and C. Costello (eds), Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014).
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have not yet been explored in as much detail,13 and the nexus between employ-
ment law and immigration law for those working on sea-fishing vessels has not 
yet been analysed in scholarly work. In common with migrant workers in other 
industries, those involved in sea fishing are vulnerable to labour exploitation due 
to a host of factors, including language barriers; lack of awareness of rights; and 
difficulties with accessing legal advice and justice in the case of violation of labour 
rights.14
Zou builds on Anderson’s work to develop the concepts of ‘hyper-dependency’—
referring to a particular tie of migrant workers to their employers as a requirement 
of their legal status—and ‘hyper-precarity’—referring to the tenuous nature of these 
workers’ entitlements to employment protection, social rights and a secure residence 
status. This article uses this conceptual framework to analyse the legal approach to 
migrant workers in the fishing sector in Ireland. Given the relatively recent advent 
of labour migration into Ireland, the issue of the labour exploitation of migrant 
workers has only received a significant level of attention in Ireland in recent years.15 
The rather limited research on labour exploitation of migrant workers to date sug-
gests the existence of a continuum of exploitation, from relatively minor breaches 
of employment law to trafficking and forced labour. One study conducted by the 
Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland (MRCI) found that migrant workers in Ireland 
often suffer from a decent work deficit, with a lack of promotion prospects, no union 
involvement, precarious hours, lack of avenues for complaint, racial discrimination 
and harassment.16 In 2016, the Low Pay Commission reported that ‘There is some 
evidence to suggest that illegal payment of sub-minimum wages occurs in Ireland 
and that migrant workers are particularly susceptible’,17 but that further research is 
13 Although see in particular M. Kilkey’s work in this field, including ‘Men and Domestic 
Labor: A Missing Link in the Global Care Chain’ (2010) 13 Men and Masculinities 126.
14 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture: Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All 2016 (Rome: UNFAO, 2016), 
at 128.
15 See, eg, A. Barrett and E. Kelly, The Impact of Ireland’s Recession on the Labour Market 
Outcomes of its Immigrants (ESRI Working Paper Series No. 355, September 2010); Y. 
O’Connell and F. McGinnity, Immigrants at Work: Ethnicity and Nationality in the Irish Labour 
Market (Dublin: Equality Authority and Economic and Social Research Institute, 2008); A. 
Barrett and D. Duffy, Are Ireland’s Immigrants Integrating into Its Labour Market? (ESRI 
Working Paper Series No. 199, June 2007); F. McGinnity and M. Gijsberts, ‘A Threat in the Air? 
Perceptions of Group Discrimination in the First Years After Migration: Comparing Polish 
Migrants in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland’ (2016) 4 Ethnicities 290.
16 See also A. Barrett and Y. McCarthy, ‘Immigrants in a Booming Economy: Analysing Their 
Earnings and Welfare Dependence’ (2007) 21 Labour 789; T. Turner, ‘The Jobs Immigrants 
Do: Issues of Displacement and Marginalization in the Irish Labour Market’ (2010) 24 Work, 
Employment and Society 318.
17 Low Pay Commission, National Recommendations for the Minimum Wage (July 2016), 
at 46.
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needed in this area. There is also evidence of discrimination against ethnic minority 
applicants at the recruitment stage.18 At the severe end of the continuum, the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency has highlighted the prevalence of severe labour exploi-
tation in Ireland and other EU countries.19 Working in domestic households was 
identified as a major risk area for severe labour exploitation in Ireland.20
Vulnerability to labour exploitation among migrant workers has been belatedly 
recognised by the Irish State in recent years, including through legislative initiatives 
designed to combat human trafficking and forced labour. The Criminal Law (Human 
Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 criminalises (for the first time) forced labour, 
within the trafficking framework.21 The Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 
2014 provided that if a person is undocumented through no fault of their own, they 
will be able to claim back pay.22 There have also been a number of administrative or 
regulatory initiatives, of which the Atypical Scheme has been the most high profile.
3. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF VULNERABILITY AMONG MIGRANT FISHERMEN IN 
IRELAND PRE-2015
As mentioned above, it is notoriously difficult to regulate effectively for decent work 
within the fishing industry, which is seasonal in nature, informal, isolated and hazard-
ous.23 In the Irish context prior to 2015, however, the greater problem was that the 
employment of non-EEA migrant fishers was effectively taking place in a regulatory 
vacuum. There were two key legal factors contributing to the vulnerable situation 
of the workers, pertaining to employment law and immigration law, which resulted 
in their being trapped in a version of the ‘hyper-dependency’ and ‘hyper-precarity’ 
described by Zou. Their hyper-precarity was rooted in their status as ‘share fisher-
men’, an established practice in the industry but one which results in exclusion from 
protective employment and social welfare frameworks. Share fishermen receive a 
share of proceeds of a vessel’s catch rather than a regular wage. The Irish courts 
have confirmed on numerous occasions that share fishermen are employed under 
18 F. McGinnity and J.  Lunn, ‘Measuring Discrimination Facing Ethnic Minority Job 
Applicants: An Irish Experiment’ (2011) 25 Work, Employment and Society 693.
19 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Severe Labour Exploitation: Workers Moving within or 
into the European Union States’ Obligations and Victims’ Rights (Vienna: EUFRA, 2015). This 
term refers to ‘all forms of labour exploitation that are criminal under the legislation of the 
European Union (EU) Member State where the exploitation occurs’ and thus covers forced 
labour, servitude and slavery (EUFRA, at 1).
20 Ibid., at 53 and 54.
21 Section 1 of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013.
22 Section 4 of the Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014.
23 UN FAO, op. cit., at 127.
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a contract for service as opposed to a contract of service, meaning that they are 
not ‘employees’ protected by employment rights and social insurance frameworks.24 
The Task Force appeared to view the employment status issue as the single biggest 
change which could be achieved through regulation. It concluded that the best way 
to minimise abuses was to ensure that workers were covered by protections afforded 
to employees.25
The hyper-dependency of the workers stemmed not from restrictions attached 
to their legal status, but rather their lack of any legal status. It seems that most 
non-EEA workers on Irish fishing boats were undocumented. There was no legal 
route to migrate to Ireland for the purposes of working on a fishing vessel, which 
was at odds with the relatively high numbers of non-EEA workers found to be on 
board.26 This follows the pattern in the domestic work sector, for example, whereby 
low-paid workers are not valued in official immigration policy but are actively 
sought out by employers—leading to high levels of undocumented work.27 Many 
vessel owners appear to have recruited workers through agencies, by way of the 
UK. Some insight into this process was provided by the evidence presented to 
the trial of two vessel owners for work permit and smuggling offences.28 The men 
had arranged with a recruitment agency to hire two workers through the UK and 
drove from the tip of southern Ireland across the border to collect the men from 
Belfast to work on their vessels. Neither worker had any form of documents or 
permission to be in Ireland. The charges were dismissed when the District Court 
judge concluded that it was unsure whether the vessel owners realised that what 
they were doing was not in proper compliance with regulations.29 An important 
part of the defence case was that other vessel owners had used the same agency 
24 DPP v McLoughlin [1986] 1 IR 355; Griffin and Deasy v Minister for Social, Community 
and Family Affairs [2002] 2 ICLMD.
25 Report of the Government Task Force on Non-EEA Workers in the Irish Fishing Industry, 
December 2015 (2015), https://www.agriculture.gov.ie/media/migration/publications/2015/
TaskForceReport141215.pdf (last accessed 13 June 2016), at 15. Hereinafter, ‘Report of the 
Task Force’.
26 Ibid., at 6–7.
27 C. Murphy, ‘Enforcing Employment Standards for Undocumented Migrant Domestic 
Workers in the UK and Ireland: Rethinking Illegality in Zones of Invisibility’ (2015) 29 Journal 
of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 29; A. Triandafyllidou (ed), Irregular Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Europe: Who Cares? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013). On drivers of irregular 
migration more generally, see S. McKay, ‘Transnational Aspects of Undeclared Work and the 
Role of EU Legislation’ (2014) 5 European Journal of Labour Law 116, at 130.
28 Under the Employment Permits Acts 2003–2014 and section 2 of the Illegal Immigrant 
(Trafficking) Act 2000.
29 Judge Dismisses Charges over Illegal Cork Trawler Workers, The Irish Times, 8 March 2017, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/judge-dismisses-charges-over-illegal-cork-
trawler-workers-1.3002669 (last accessed 13 June 2017).
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and route to recruit workers for a number of years, with the knowledge of at least 
one government agency.30
Undocumented fishermen were thus dependent on the vessel owner in many cases 
for their job, accommodation and decent working conditions. Pursuing redress for 
labour law violations would have involved jeopardising all of this and—crucially—
risking detection and deportation. In any case, as will be discussed further below, it 
is doubtful whether the workers could have successfully accessed any employment 
law remedy under Irish law given their undocumented status and the operation of 
the doctrine of illegality in contract.
4. ADDRESSING VULNERABILITY THROUGH REGULATORY REFORMS
Although reports from a variety of sources suggest that various government depart-
ments and state agencies were aware of potential problems within the fishing indus-
try prior to the Guardian exposé in 2015,31 the legal and policy response following the 
report was unusually rapid. A Government Task Force on non-EEA workers in the 
Irish fishing fleet was convened following a Cabinet decision on 3 November (the very 
day after the reports), and had concluded its work by December. It was comprised 
of 16 relevant government departments and state agencies.32 Non-governmental 
stakeholders—fish producer organisations, the International Transport Workers 
Federation, and the Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland33—were not invited to be full 
participants in the Task Force and were therefore not involved in deliberating the 
details of the scheme. Rather, they made short presentations to the Task Force out-
lining their views on how best to proceed. These diverse stakeholders are of one 
30 ‘“It Was Two Years of Absolute Torment” – Immigration Charges Dismissed Against Two 
Irish Fishermen Who Hired Filipino Sailors’, Irish Independent, 8 March 2017, http://www.
independent.ie/irish-news/courts/it-was-two-years-of-absolute-torment-immigration-charges-
dismissed-against-two-irish-fishermen-who-hired-filipino-sailors-35513223.html (last accessed 
13 June 2017).
31 The Guardian, 2 November 2015, Part Four: ‘An Open Secret’. Also semi-structured inter-
views carried out by the author with Senator Ged Nash (former Minister of State for Business 
and Employment, involved in developing the Atypical Scheme in this capacity), 7 June 2017, 
and with a representative of the Irish Fish Producers Organisation (11 May 2017).
32 Department of Agriculture Food & the Marine, Sea Fisheries Protection Authority 
(SFPA), Bord Iascaigh Mhara (BIM), Department of Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation (includ-
ing Workplace Relations Commission), Department of Justice & Equality (including Irish 
Naturalisation & Immigration Service), An Garda Síochána, Attorney General’s Office, 
Department of Defence, Irish Naval Service, Department of Transport, Tourism & Sport 
(including Marine Survey Office), Revenue Commissioners, Department of Social Protection, 
Health & Safety Authority.
33 Killybegs Fishermens Organisation, Irish Fish Producers Organisation, Irish South & West 
Fish Producers Organisation and Irish South & East Fish Producers Organisation.
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opinion that this was a missed opportunity in developing a workable and nuanced 
solution to the problem of labour exploitation in the sector.34 This section sets out 
the key features of the reform undertaken through the Atypical Scheme.
A. Establishing a Comprehensive Regulatory Environment
The stated aim of the final report of the Task Force was to put in place a ‘comprehen-
sive regulatory environment covering all aspects of the employment of non-EEA 
workers’.35 To deal with the two-pronged issue of employment status and immigra-
tion status, the Task Force proposed a ‘holistic approach’,36 with its centrepiece the 
atypical scheme of work permits for non-EEA fishermen. As mentioned already, in 
the Irish system, atypical working schemes are administrative measures which con-
stitute a form of temporary labour migration regime. Under the Atypical Scheme for 
non-EEA fishermen, the Task Force decided that there would be 512-month permits 
made available, first to existing members of the fleet and then to external appli-
cants.37 The scheme was limited in scope to certain segments of the Irish sea-fishing 
fleet for vessels above 15 m in length.38
Although the Task Force insisted that this was ‘not a question’39 of legalising 
undocumented workers, in practical terms, for existing workers this was essen-
tially a regularisation scheme—provided that undocumented workers were able 
to negotiate and obtain a contract of employment.40 In order for a permit to be 
granted, the sea-fishing boat licence holder (employer) had to enter into a contract 
of employment with the crew member, which would be lodged with the Department 
of Agriculture, Food and the Marine. The contract of employment would include 
the right to a safe working environment, regular breaks and rest periods, annual 
leave and payment of statutory minimum wage, enforceable in Irish law in the usual 
34 Semi-structured interviews carried out by the author with the International Transport 
Workers Federation Co-ordinator for Britain and Ireland (‘ITF’) (9 May 2016); a representa-
tive of Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland (MRCI, 8 June 2017); and a representative of the 
IFPO (11 May 2017). Hereinafter, ‘ITF interview’; ‘MRCI interview’; and ‘IFPO interview’, 
respectively.
35 Report of the Task Force, n.25, at 15.
36 Ibid., at 16.
37 From 1 July 2016, applications for crew members from within the State were no longer 
accepted. Since then, applications have been accepted only from persons outside of the State. 
Atypical Permission Scheme for non-EEA Workers on Irish Fishing Vessels: Report of the Risk 
Profiling and Inspection Group (October 2016, copy on file with the author). Hereinafter, 
‘Report of the RPIG’.
38 Polyvalent, Beamer and Specific segments.
39 Report of the Task Force, n.25, at 15.
40 Ibid., at 16.
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way.41 The licence owner was made directly responsible for the contract of employ-
ment, which was required to be certified by a solicitor.42 The scheme also specifically 
clarified that the employer would be responsible for deductions for tax and social 
insurance contributions.43 This constituted a radical shift for vessel owners who, in 
the main, had little experience of employment regulation. In addition, the Task Force 
decided that if either the employer or employee breached the contract, the per-
mit would be revoked and no further atypical worker permission would be made 
granted to the party in breach.44
In addition to changing the employment status of migrant fishers, the Atypical 
Scheme puts in place various mechanisms to formalise the arrangements surround-
ing the employment of migrant fishers. At the recruitment stage, the certified con-
tract of employment must be in place before the worker travels to Ireland (for those 
applying from outside the country).45 Employers must also provide evidence of ade-
quate healthcare coverage for all such employees.46 A depository of contracts was 
established, which would allow them to be shared with the relevant regulatory bod-
ies.47 The pre-approval application process involves the provision of a range of docu-
mentation to the central depository in addition to the contract of employment.48 
In order to avail of the scheme, employers are thus required to voluntarily subject 
themselves to a level of scrutiny, formality and regulation that was previously non-
existent in respect of work performed on board the vessel. For their part, the crew 
member is required to carry relevant documentation at all times within the State to 
facilitate inspection.49
B. Freedom to Change Employer
One of the criticisms levelled at temporary labour migration schemes is that tempo-
rary migration often statuses tie the worker to the employer. This has been a central 
aspect of the debate on the overseas domestic workers visa in the UK, for example.50 
The Atypical Scheme does not impose such a condition: a crew member may enter 
41 Ibid., at 18, Atypical Scheme (annexed to the Report of the Task Force). The contract tem-
plate (minimum conditions) is outlined at p 22 of the scheme.
42 Atypical Scheme, para 9.  The requirement for the direct employment relationship was 
included to eliminate the involvement of recruitment agencies in the employment relationship.
43 Ibid., para 7.
44 Ibid., paras 15 and 16.
45 Ibid., para 17.
46 Ibid., para 22.
47 Ibid., para 9.
48 As detailed in Report of the Task Force, n.25, at 21.
49 Atypical Scheme, para 12.
50 See V. Mantouvalou, ‘Am I Free Yet? Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery’ (2015) 42 
Journal of Law and Society 329.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ilj/article-abstract/46/3/417/4103541 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 11 N
ovem
ber 2019
426
Industrial Law Journal Volume 46
a new contract of employment with another employer, with any change subject to 
the same conditions as a new application under the scheme. However, the worker is 
still in a position of dependency and subordination vis-à-vis the employer. In prac-
tical terms, as the employment permit is granted to an individual employer rather 
than for the fishing sector, in order to change employer the worker would need to 
convince a new employer to go through the formalities described above in order to 
obtain a new contract of employment with them. In addition, in a relatively small 
industry in which the employers are well networked,51 employees who raise labour 
law issues may find it difficult to gain alternative employment in the sector.52 The 
experience of MRCI in assisting workers (through outreach activities and drop-in 
centres) is that the freedom to change employer is too difficult to exercise in practice 
and that the rules of the scheme still do not sufficiently empower the employee to 
demand decent working conditions.53
C. Enhancing Enforcement through Co-operation and Development of New Inspection 
Protocols
Enhancing the effective enforcement of employment and health and safety rights 
was identified as a key plank of the reforms by the Task Force, which outlined that co-
operation would be underpinned by an inter-agency Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU). The MoU provides for information exchange among the multiple enforce-
ment bodies involved, including labour inspectors, immigration services, health and 
safety bodies and maritime regulatory authorities. The MoU is intended to under-
pin a ‘coherent and transparent cross-Government approach’54 to the monitoring of 
statutory requirements relating to non-EEA workers on board Irish fishing vessels.
The Workplace Relations Commission (‘WRC’) is the main labour inspection body in 
Ireland and is empowered to enter vessels under the Workplace Relations Commission 
Act 2015.55 The labour inspectorate had scant experience with examining fishing vessels 
prior to 2016, given that most people working on board such vessels were share fisher-
men and outside their inspection remit.56 In the first quarter of 2016, the WRC engaged in 
51 In the trial discussed above, the court room was packed with fishermen expressing their 
anger that the criminal charges were being pursued against the vessel owners.
52 MRCI interview, n.34.
53 Ibid.
54 ‘Memorandum of Understanding for the Monitoring and Enforcement of the Terms of 
Employment of non-EEA Crewmen in Parts of the Irish Sea Fishing Fleet Pursuant to the 
Establishment of the Atypical Work Permission Scheme’ (copy on file with the author), at 6.
55 Section 27 of the Workplace Relations Commission Act 2015, which specifically states at s 
27(8) that ‘premises’ includes a ‘vehicle, vessel, ship and railway carriage’.
56 Any action prior to 2015 was complaint-driven. Semi-structured interview conducted by 
the author with a representative of the WRC, 30 May 2016 (‘WRC interview’).
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information and awareness dissemination to make vessel owners aware of their new obli-
gations in relation to fishermen with Atypical Scheme work permits.57 It also embarked 
on a programme of inspecting all vessels which potentially fell within the scheme.58
The WRC has found it necessary to adapt its usual inspection protocols in line with 
the specificity of the fishing sector. One of the key challenges is ‘finding’ vessels which 
move around frequently, and to this end, a satellite tracking app is used to locate par-
ticular vessels.59 The first phase of inspections has been on vessels moored at harbour, 
and inspectors have actively used complementary surveillance (whereby inspectors 
would observe who is coming and going from vessels) to try to identify crew mem-
bers.60 In addition, the WRC has developed a system of risk profiling to identify which 
boats should be inspected and re-inspected.61 There is no doubt that these measures 
constitute a genuine attempt to get to grips with the challenging environment of the 
fishing industry, within a relatively short space of time. However, as will be seen below, 
the effectiveness of the inspection regime in preventing exploitation is hotly contested.
5. THE ATYPICAL SCHEME: MODEL OF GOOD PRACTICE OR MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
Have the Atypical Scheme and complementary reforms achieved the aim of the Task 
Force to ‘minimise’ the risk of exploitation while also ‘ensuring that reputable employers 
are able to recruit trained and experienced crew members’? Unfortunately, defects in the 
design of the scheme and difficulties with enforcement have meant that neither of these 
objectives has been met. This section suggests that the lack of a fully researched evidence 
base for the measures adopted, and the development of the scheme without comprehen-
sive input from stakeholders, are at the root of some of the problems identified.
A. Low Take-up of Work Permits
The most striking outcome of the reform process has been the low take-up of the 
scheme among workers already in the State. Of the 500 available permits (which both 
workers’ and fish producers’ organisations had thought would be too few),62 just 196 
57 WRC interview, n.56.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. and Report of the RPIG, n.37.
62 ‘Calls for Ireland to Double Number of Permits to Protect Migrant Fishermen’, Guardian, 
23 November 2015, available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/
nov/23/irish-fishing-industry-calls-for-ireland-double-number-permits-issued-migrant-fisher-
men (last accessed 13 June 2017).
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were issued to the end of May 2017.63 Of these 196 permits, 32 were revoked and 42 have 
been renewed to date.64 The reasons for this are difficult to assess. The International 
Transport Workers Federation Co-ordinator for Britain and Ireland (‘ITF’) maintains 
that some employers simply do not want to sign up to a contract of employment and a 
work permit as that means that they would have to pay minimum wage to the workers 
all year round.65 MRCI has also noted that their experience on the ground has been 
that some employers did not want to engage with the levels of formality attached to 
participating in the scheme, or the expense involved with solicitors’ fees.66 This resulted 
the dismissal of some fishermen, and also a lack of interest in renewing work permits 
for a second year.67 A lack of information on the Atypical Scheme for fishermen them-
selves, made available in their own language, was also a factor, in MRCI’s view.68
One common theme identified by all non-governmental stakeholders is the awk-
ward fit of the employer–employee relationship with the traditional share fishing 
model. The transition to an employment relationship was seen by government as a 
key means to ensure better regulation of the conditions of migrant workers, however 
in practice it has caused difficulties. The Irish Fish Producer’s Organisation (‘IFPO’) is 
of the view that the scheme has not been popular because the move to make migrant 
workers employees (rather than share fishermen) is at odds with the long-standing 
structure of the industry and results in a two-tier system among crew members. When 
income from the catch is low, the Irish and EU crew members on board resent that 
migrant workers are entitled to be paid minimum wage in any event.69 When the catch 
is good, the migrant workers are disadvantaged as they earn less than others doing the 
same work.70 The inequality that this creates on board is problematic for vessel owners.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the low take-up of work permits has meant 
that more EU workers are now being employed instead of non-EEA workers.71 
However, there are other potential explanations and consequences. The Risk 
Profiling and Inspection Group (‘RPIG’), formed after the work of the Task Force 
had completed,72 noted that ‘it is possible that there has been a shift of workers from 
63 Statistics provided by WRC, on file with the author.
64 Statistics provided by WRC, on file with the author. The author requested further informa-
tion from the Department of Justice and Equality on these figures, and the reasons for revoca-
tion, however, there has been no response to date.
65 ITF interview, n.34.
66 MRCI interview, n.34.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 IFPO interview, n.34.
70 Report of the RPIG, n.37, at 10.
71 Ibid., at 10.
72 Its membership comprised the Workplace Relations Commission; An Garda Síochána; 
BIM; Department of Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation: Department of Justice & Equality/Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service; Department of Transport, Tourism & Sport/Marine 
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vessels of 15 metres and more to vessels of shorter length’73 and recommended that 
consideration should be given to extending the Scheme to smaller vessels.74 More 
worryingly, the Group cited evidence of ongoing ‘off scheme’ recruitment campaigns 
aimed at attracting non-EEA workers and offering terms and conditions inferior to 
those enjoyed by employees required under the Scheme.75 The Group notes that rig-
orous monitoring of the Scheme, targeted inspections and an information campaign 
for agencies and workers in the country of origin is the most effective strategy to 
counteract this ongoing informal recruitment.
B. Continuing Breaches of Employment Standards?
The inspections to date of boats falling within the scope of the Scheme have shown 
that contraventions of both employment law and immigration law remain a feature 
of this sector. The inspection of 141 vessels revealed 196 contraventions, including 
30 cases of undocumented workers, 15 breaches of the Atypical Scheme and 72 
instances in which no employment records were kept.76 While these figures show 
that the level of non-compliance is high, it is difficult to discern the true level of 
severity of employment law breaches from the work of the WRC. Pay rate contra-
ventions were found in only two cases and only eight cases of problems with annual 
leave were detected, for example. Sunday compensation was an issue in 17 cases. In 
addition, a joint operation undertaken between the WRC and the police, involving 
40 vessels, uncovered ‘no evidence of human trafficking or labour exploitation…in 
any location’.77
These findings are at odds with the views of those involved with the workers on 
an ongoing basis, who believe that conditions have not significantly improved since 
2015.78 MRCI, the ITF and Senator Ged Nash79 all report that conditions may in fact 
be worsening for some individuals, even where they have been regularised through 
Survey Office; Department of Defence/Naval Service; Health and Safety Authority; Office 
of the Revenue Commissioners; Sea Fisheries Protection Authority; Workplace Relations 
Commission; Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine.
73 Report of the RPIG, n.37, at 13.
74 Ibid., at 13.
75 Ibid., at 13.
76 Statistics obtained from the WRC, on file with the author.
77 Frances Fitzgerald (Minister for Justice and Equality), written answers to parliamentary 
questions [37687/16], 16 December 2016.
78 See concerns raised by Senator Ged Nash in the Irish Senate. Seanad Debates, 8 February 
2017. See also ‘Scheme for Fishing Crews is Legitimising Slavery’, The Irish Times, 7 February 
2017. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/scheme-for-fishing-crews-is-legitimis-
ing-slavery-1.2965818 (last accessed 13 June 2017).
79 Former Minister of State for Business and Employment, involved in developing the 
Atypical Scheme.
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the scheme—most importantly by their wages going down as a result of the transi-
tion from share fisherman to employee.80 This tallies with the Guardian’s updated 
findings that some workers are now receiving minimum wage for a 39-hour week, 
even when working a much longer week—sometimes up to 100 hours.81 So what are 
the reasons for these discrepancies and the possible lack of detection by the enforce-
ment bodies?
C. Fragmented, Limited Enforcement?
The responsibility for enforcing health and safety, employment and immigration 
regulation in the fishing sector is highly fragmented among a variety of government 
departments, law enforcement, the defence forces and regulatory bodies.82 While 
the MoU has formalised and enhanced co-operation, the fragmented responsibility 
makes it difficult for any one body to ascertain a full picture of the conditions on 
board fishing vessels. This point is clearly illustrated by the division of responsibil-
ity in respect of minimum wage and working time compliance. While the WRC’s 
responsibilities relate to the enforcement of employment rights legislation, including 
minimum wage legislation,83 the Marine Survey Office (‘MSO’)84 is responsible for 
enforcing legislation relating to the rest periods and maximum working time provi-
sions for sea fishermen.85 To date, there has been no official co-operation between 
or joint inspections involving the WRC and the MSO since the signing of the MoU. 
The separation of responsibility relating to payment for working hours on the one 
hand and rest periods on the other hand creates an information gap for WRC inspec-
tors in their assessment of compliance with the minimum wage rules. This technical 
enforcement point thus potentially undermines the effectiveness of the basic protec-
tion of the right to be paid set out in the scheme.
More generally, the inspection work of the WRC is limited both in scope and 
method. In addition to the working time/rest time issue outlined above, the WRC 
does not have jurisdiction to directly assess the living conditions of migrant work-
ers (which also belongs to the MSO), or investigate situations of harassment or 
80 MRCI interview, n.34; ITF interview, n.34; and Ged Nash interview, n.31.
81 ‘Irish Trawlers Accused of Alarming Abuses of Migrant Workers’, Guardian, 8 February 
2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/08/irish-trawlers-abuses-
migrant-workers (last accessed 13 June 2016).
82 Inspections can be carried out by the police, the Naval Service, the Health and Safety 
Authority, the Marine Survey Office and the Workplace Relations Commission.
83 Most importantly, the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994; Organisation of 
Working Time Act 1997; and the National Minimum Wage Acts 2000 and 2015.
84 Based within the Department of Tourism, Transport and Sport.
85 European Communities (Workers on Board Sea-Going Fishing Vessels) (Organisation of 
Working Time) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 709/2003). The MoU specifically states (at 5): ‘WRC 
inspectors are not authorised officers under the legislation and have no role in its enforcement’.
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discrimination which go beyond the statutory functions of the WRC. In addition, 
the WRC’s method of inspection is largely based on records kept (or not kept, as 
the case may be) by the vessel owner.86 Crew members are also interviewed (where 
possible, in private away from the vessel), and as noted above the WRC also carries 
out surveillance.87 However, records, interviews and surveillance on land may not 
give an accurate picture of what is actually happening on the vessel out at sea. This is 
particularly the case where records are very deficient or where fishermen have poor 
English and no interpreter is provided. Identifying the actual crew members of the 
vessel when boarding at harbours can be problematic, as can the lack of knowledge 
about when a particular boat may land.88 The next phase of the WRC inspections will 
involve inspections at sea,89 which may help to address some of these issues.
Finally, the ITF and MRCI have criticised the ‘voluntary compliance’ approach 
adopted by the WRC. When asked to report on the continuing serious allegations 
of illegal pay and conditions for workers in the fishing industry, the Minister for 
Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation noted that ‘Employers/Vessel Owners are afforded 
all reasonable opportunity to rectify contraventions and, where relevant, pay any 
unpaid wages and/or make good on entitlements arising from these contraven-
tions’.90 Compliance notices or legal proceedings will only be initiated where an 
employer has failed or is unwilling to effect compliance.91 MRCI suggests that this is 
inadequate to address the level of non-compliance in the industry and that harsher 
measures, such as depriving the boat owner of their fishing licence for example, 
should have been considered.92 However, the voluntary compliance approach is the 
established practice of the WRC across all sectors, and there was no suggestion in the 
work of the Task Force that this should be adapted for the fishing industry.
D. The Broader Context: Overlap of Immigration and Employment Enforcement
One of the most important barriers to achieving a protective regulatory environ-
ment for migrant fishermen is not unique to the fishing sector, and comes back 
to the age-old problem of the legal interaction of immigration and employ-
ment frameworks. While international commentary has identified that a firewall 
between employment inspectors and immigration authorities is the most effective 
86 Workplace Relations Commission, Annual Report 2016, at 24.
87 Ibid.; also WRC interview, n.56.
88 Report of the RPIG, n.37, at 10–11.
89 WRC interview, n.56.
90 Mary Mitchell O’Connor (Minister for Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation), writ-
ten answers to parliamentary questions [9355/17], 23 February 2017.
91 Ibid.
92 MRCI interview, n.34.
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way to ensure that fear of deportation does not hinder migrant workers in claiming 
their labour rights,93 immigration and employment enforcement are completely 
intertwined in the Irish context. The WRC has enforcement functions under the 
Employment Permits Acts 2003–2014, and as such is an extension of the immi-
gration authorities. It is not the policy of the WRC to prosecute undocumented 
employees for breach of the Acts.94 However, an inspector might ‘issue a direction 
to a worker to immediately cease work’ where a non-EEA worker is detected with 
no permission to work.95 Even more significantly, if they find an undocumented 
person on board they would share that information with the Irish Naturalisation 
and Immigration Service (in accordance with the MoU)96 and that person could 
ultimately be deported.
In order to detect and pursue violations of minimum wage legislation in particu-
lar, the WRC and other bodies would require the co-operation of and statements 
from crew on board. However, migrant workers are likely to fear either losing their 
work permit, not having their work permit renewed, or being deported if detected 
while undocumented. The Risk Profiling and Inspection Group itself acknowledges 
that the enhanced co-operation on foot of the MoU probably has the unintended 
consequence that unauthorised workers may not participate in safety training for 
fear of being detected by other agencies.97
A related problem is that, aside from their deportability, undocumented workers 
remain excluded from employment protections under Irish law. The question of the 
enforceability of employment law by undocumented workers was raised for the first 
time in Ireland in Hussein v The Labour Court,98 which was ultimately decided by 
the Supreme Court. In Ireland, as in the UK,99 this is a thorny issue as the doctrine 
of illegality in contract means that the underlying contract of employment is tainted 
by the illegal work and invalid, thus meaning that the worker is not an ‘employee’ for 
93 See the recommendations of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (‘EUFRA’), Migrants 
in an Irregular Situation Employed in Domestic Work: Fundamental Rights Challenges for the 
European Union and Its Member States (EUFRA, July 2011), at 45. See generally, G. Noll, ‘The 
Laws of Undocumented Migration’ (2010) 12 European Journal of Migration and Law 143.
94 WRC interview, n.56.
95 Report of the RPIG, n.37, at 6.
96 MoU, n.54, at 8.
97 Report of the RPIG, n.37, at 11.
98 Hussein v The Labour Court [2012] IEHC 364; [2015] IESC 58.
99 For a recent commentary in the UK (although with a focus on illegality in tort rather than 
contract), see M. Zou and J. Goudkamp, ‘Hounga v Allen’ (2015) 29 Journal of Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Law 56; J. Goudkamp and M. Zou, ‘The Defence of Illegality in Tort: 
Beyond Judicial Redemption?’ (2015) 74 Cambridge Law Journal 13; A. Bogg and S. Green, 
‘Rights Are Not Just for the Virtuous: What Hounga Means for the Illegality Defence in the 
Discrimination Torts’ (2015) 44 ILJ 101; and A. Bogg and T. Novitz, ‘Race Discrimination and 
the Doctrine of Illegality’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 12.
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the purposes of employment law.100 The current position in Ireland is that undocu-
mented workers cannot generally enforce employment rights, although there were 
some obiter dicta comments in the Supreme Court to the effect that this might be 
reviewed in the appropriate case, in light of the principle of proportionality.101
In summary, the protective impact of an individual measure such as the Atypical 
Scheme is limited in the broader context of a system which does not segregate 
employment and immigration enforcement, and in which undocumented workers 
are almost completely unprotected by employment standards.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the reforms examined in this article display some elements of good practice 
in terms of regulating to counteract labour exploitation among temporary migrant 
workers. In particular, the freedom in principle of an employee to move employer, 
the system of risk profiling of vessels and the concerted campaign of labour inspec-
tions of fishing vessels are to be welcomed.
The analysis has also shown, however, that despite these positive features, the 
reforms have not, in practice, addressed the problems of the hyper-dependence and 
hyper-precarity of migrant workers in the sea-fishing fleet. The difficulties caused by 
the imposition of an employment relationship for non-EEA crew members, in the 
situation where other workers on the same vessel would remain share fishermen, is 
one consequence of a lack of thorough consultation with non-governmental stake-
holders with in-depth knowledge of the industry. Moreover, the lack of detection 
of pay rate contraventions, and of severe forms of labour exploitation, as well as 
evidence of continuing off-scheme recruitment, raise questions about the adequacy 
of existing means of enforcement.
Fundamentally, the specific measures outlined in this article do not displace the 
deeper causes of vulnerability of migrants in the workplace: the inextricable link 
between immigration status and enforceability of employment standards; the inter-
twinement of immigration and employment enforcement regimes; and dependency 
on the employer for a temporary migration status. Individual regulatory measures 
will continue to have a limited impact unless the state acknowledges and addresses 
100 See generally, Murphy n.27; E. Dewhurst, ‘Models of Protection of the Right of Irregular 
Immigrants to Back Pay: The Impact of the Interconnection between Immigration Law and 
Labor Law’ (2013) 35 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 101; E. Dewhurst, ‘The Gap 
between Immigration and Employment Law in Ireland: Irregular Immigrants Fall through the 
Cracks’ (2013) 10 Irish Journal of Employment Law 11; E. Dewhurst, ‘The Denial of Labour 
Rights to Irregular Immigrants under Irish Labour Law’ (2012) 4 European Journal of Labour 
Law 300.
101 Hussein v The Labour Court [2012] IEHC 364, para 52, per Murray J.
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the imbalance in the power relations between the employer and employee which is 
produced by these factors.
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